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ABSTRACT
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are the greatest casualty producing and costly
weapon system employed by the enemy on the asymmetric battlefield of today. Despite Billions
of dollars spent on technological devices to counter the IED threat, IEDs are still responsible for
roughly 50% of battlefield casualties. A tremendous amount of effort and resource has and
continues to be levied in the pursuit of a technological solution to the IED problem. By contrast,
little research has been done on Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED) procedures. This
paper explores the potential of CIED procedures as a casualty reduction mechanism by
comparing two observed tactical procedures used in patrolling convoy routes.
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CHAPTER ONE: MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH
Introduction
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) account for more casualties and wounded on
today’s battlefield than any other single weapon system accounting for over 50% of casualties in
Afghanistan (Wilson, 2007). IEDs are the weapon of choice of insurgent and guerrilla forces.
This weapon system has had a prolific effect on Armed Forces across the globe. The U.S. alone
has spent in excess of 75 billion dollars on armored vehicles and technologies designed to
mitigate or defeat the effects of the IED (Zoroya, 2013). This amount exceeds the total annual
military expenditure for 2014 of all but four of the world’s military services (Perlo-Freeman,
Fleurant, Wezeman, & Wezeman, 2015). Despite the amount of money and technological
innovation, and saturation of technology on the battlefield with the creation of the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in 2006, casualty rates peaked in
2010-2011, as troop levels saw a reduction at the end of 2011; IED casualties also saw a similar
reduction in number. Recently, the White House and Department of Defense DoD have
identified IEDs as an enduring threat that will continue to play a role in future conflicts (Obama,
2013).
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the importance and concern of the IED on
today’s battlefield and to lay a foundation for potential solution. U.S. Counter Improvised
Explosive Device (CIED) efforts focus mainly on addressing the issue with technological
innovations (Cary & Youssef, 2011 updated 2014). The vast majority of the estimated 75 billion
dollars the U.S. has spent on CIED over the last decade has been on new equipment and
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technology (JIEDDO, 2008, 2009, 2011). The threat of the IED is not going to disappear
however; the amount of resources to combat the problem shall be seriously constrained relative
to recent expenditure, as budgets become increasingly smaller. JIEDDO for example has already
started to execute a plan to reduce its personnel from a peak of 3,900 to 400 by 2017
(Weisgerber, 2013). Given the budgetary constraints, a look into past solutions as well as current
methodologies employed by less technologically equipped forces may yield a sustainable CIED
approach as well as providing the tools to reduce casualties. In an effort to keep this paper
unclassified, sources used in this paper are all freely available and unrestricted.

Definitions
Two definitions are important in understanding what an IED is as well as understanding
the developments that led to the IED problem. The two definitions are the current definition of
an IED as defined by field manual (FM) 3-31.8 and the definition of a booby trap as defined by
FM 5-31 which became obsolete in 1980. FM 5-31 is an important document, as it allows a
comparison between current insurgency operations and doctrine used by the U.S. Army prior to
1980.
FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad defines and IED as:
“A nonstandard explosive device used to target U.S. Soldiers, civilians, NGOs, and
government agencies. IEDs range from crude homemade explosives to extremely
intricate remote-controlled devices. The devices are used to instill fear in U.S.
Soldiers, coalition forces, and the local civilian population. Their employment is
intended to diminish U.S. national resolve with mounting casualties. The
sophistication and range of IEDs continue to increase as technology continues to
improve and as terrorists gain experience.”
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While the definition indicates that IEDs are becoming more sophisticated they are not by
any means a new threat (FM 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company, 2006). FM 3-21.8 further
defines three IED types as “timed explosive devices”, “impact detonated devices”, and “vehicle
bombs” or vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).
“Time explosive device is any IED that is detonated by remote control such as by
the ring of a cell phone; by other electronic means; or by the combination of wire
and either a power source or timed fuse” (FM 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company,
2006, pp. G-1).
“Vehicle bombs include explosive-laden vehicles detonated with electronic
command wire or wireless remote control, or with timed devices. They might be
deployed with or without drivers” (FM 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company, 2006,
pp. G-1)
FM 5-31 Booby Traps defines a booby trap as an:
“Explosive charge cunningly contrived to be fired by an unsuspecting person who
disturbs an apparently harmless object or performs a presumably safe act. Two
types are in use: improvised and manufactured. Improvised booby traps are
assembled from specially provided materially generally used for other purposes.
Manufactured booby-traps are dirty trick devices made at a factory for issue to
troops. They usually imitate some object or article that has souvenir appeal or may
be used by the target to advantage”.

Historical Background
The term IED is relatively new and arose from the British military in describing tactics
and actions by the Irish Republican Army in the 1970s (Benson, 2012). Despite some of the
popular belief that IEDs are a new weapon from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
improvised explosive devices or commonly known as booby traps have been present on the
battlefield for centuries. Many purposely manufactured fused switches and ignition systems were
developed and employed during WWI (Jones, 2004). By WWII every major power actually

3

manufactured booby traps and/or components for use in improvised explosives (FM 5-31
Boobytraps, 1965). The National Archives is chocked full of video footage of “booby trap” and
mine neutralization in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam. In WWII, the War Department found
improvised explosives such a nuisance that they created a cartoon series “Private SNAFU” in an
effort to teach soldiers about the dangers of the battlefield, booby traps, and souvenir scavenging.
While filmed in the 1940s their message is no less relevant today; many of the videos subjects
such as booby traps, and information leakage are still relevant on today’s modern battlefield
(Archives, 1943). .
One may be surprised to find that the U.S. Army viewed IEDs or “booby traps” as a
battlefield enabler until 1980, while never widely used by U.S. forces in conflicts, use of such
devices practically stopped with the signing of the Convention on Conventional Weapons
(CCW). The CCW limited the use of fragmentation weapons, landmines, booby traps, incendiary
weapons, and blinding laser weapons (Nations, 1980) . Several obsolete Army manuals are freely
available on the internet and reputable sources such as amazon. The now “obsolete” manuals
cover the doctrine, manufacture, and employment procedures for booby traps, improvised
munitions, and incendiaries. Three relevant manuals are FM 5-31, TM 31-210, and TM 31-2101. FM 5-31 “Booby Traps” covered the doctrine, use, manufacture, and employment procedures
for booby traps on the battlefield. TM 31-210 Improvised Munitions Handbook covers the
process to manufacture explosive materials out of common locally sourced materials. Finally,
TM 31-210-1 Incendiaries covered the use of both conventional and improvised incendiary
devices. Though not widely used by conventional units, the use of booby traps could be
authorized by division commanders, however higher level commanders could rescind the
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authorization of use at any time (FM 5-31 Boobytraps, 1965). Current policy restricts U.S. troops
from using booby traps and incendiaries however, a Corps commander can authorize their use
when deployment is in accordance with international law. .
How does the investigation into “obsolete” manuals benefit the soldier on the battlefield
today? Quite simply put, insurgents use many of the devices, explosive materials, and ignition
methods described in detail within these manuals. One example of a device described in detail
with in FM 5-31, is the pressure cooker “booby trap” or now referred to as pressure cooker IED.
This design appears across the globe on both the battlefield and in domestic attacks. The most
recent well-known domestic attack of this type of device was the Boston Marathon bombing.
Figure 1 depicts the illustration of the pressure cooker “booby trap” next to the post blast
evidence from the pressure cooker “bomb” used in the Boston Marathon attack. The insurgents
in Afghanistan and Iraq employ similar devices (Sisk, 2013). The largest difference between the
two devices is the initiation mechanism; the Boston bomb utilized an electronic timing
mechanism instead of a mechanical push/pull initiation(FM 5-31 Boobytraps, 1965; Parascadola,
2013). The overall design however differs very little.
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Figure 1: Pressure Cooker IED

FM 5-31 also illustrates and instructs on the construction of the explosively formed
penetrator (EFP), one of the most devastating IEDs currently on the battlefield in terms of
relative damage (Cockburn, 2007). EFPs are particularly successful when they hit their target.
The aimed IED on detonation forms a directional shape charge, essentially a molten spear like
slug that is able to punch through most armor (Garaux, 2009). EFPs cause extensive damage
against coalition vehicles in Iraq, but only make up a small percentage of all IED attacks. The
estimated cost of one of these weapons is only 20-30 dollars (Cockburn, 2007).
These manuals illustrate one of the continued problems the U.S. military has faced over
the time, knowledge management. Despite fighting several insurgencies and gaining valuable
knowledge on counter insurgency and guerrilla warfare, at it the wars conclusion, the focus on
training typically reverts to the next conventional force on force war. The military slowly
neglects the valuable knowledge it gained from the previous conflicts in which it had to fight an
insurgency and begins fighting the next one unprepared (Ucko, 2009, p. 26). While FM 34.210
Explosive Hazard Operations refers to booby traps, it covers them in six pages, very different
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from the 130 pages found in FM 5-31. This would indicate that Training and Doctrine Command
view booby traps as less of a priority than previous periods. As such, many of the skills and
expertise needed to detect and defeat IEDs had to be re-learned when encountered in the latest
conflicts.
The biggest difference between the technologies from 50+ years ago and today
concerning IEDs and booby traps are initiation methods, improvised solutions of today replaced
many of the once prevalently manufactured switches and fuses found in previous conflicts
(Jones, 2004, p. 259). While the methods and doctrine of the past are still present and employed,
technology has ushered in an era of the wireless remote command detonated device, cell phones
and other wireless technologies have enabled more control over IEDs and booby traps than ever
before. Digital timing circuitry also brings a level of sophistication and accuracy that is not
available in chemical based timing fuses. Sophistication and adaptation usher in challenges in
countering these new initiation methods.

Pursuit of CIED Technology
To counter the IED threat the U.S. has been pouring money into technological methods to
counter the IED. Most of the technologies focus on defeating the device or force protection. Of
the 75 billion spent on CIED thus far nearly two thirds has been on force protection in the form
of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protective (MRAP) vehicle. Currently there are over 1800
initiatives in technologies for CIED under JIEDDOs watch (Martin et al., 2013). While there is
no debate that the MRAP has saved lives, one can argue that the use of such equipment can
impede mission sets. The vehicle itself being extraordinarily heavy can only traverse on certain

7

roadways. Furthermore, 72% of the world’s bridges cannot support the MRAP according to the
Marine Corps assistant deputy commander for plans, policies, and operations (N. Defense,
2008). The use of the MRAP makes integrating with the population and COIN operations more
difficult, as rural populations are sometimes un-reachable by the behemoth vehicles (Byford,
2010). With fewer route options available for travel it is far easier for the enemy to predict and
strike with IEDs. Further, not creating patterns of travel that are predicable is problematic when
using a vehicle that few roadways support.

The Non-Technological Approach
When looking for casualty reduction mechanisms to counter the effects of the IED, the
U.S. may not be the ideal model. Many countries spend less on their entire annual military
budgets as compared to the U.S. expenditure on CIED (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2015). As such,
how have the coalition partners with a fraction of the budget the U.S. has approached the IED
problem? The Romanian Army is an example of a less technologically equipped force. In Zabul
Province, Afghanistan, Romanians operate M1152 Up-Armored Humvees, the very same
vehicles in which the U.S. was rapidly replacing with MRAPs. They are equipped with an
electronic countermeasure devices. These devices help protect patrols and convoys from
remotely-detonated IEDs (Lockheed, 2011). Other than the electronic countermeasures, the
equipment was the basic up-armored Humvee deemed inadequate and used by the U.S. prior to
the rapid fielding of the MRAP.
The Romanian mission in Zabul Province focused on keeping Hwy 1 open and
trafficable. Hwy 1 is a major highway ring circling Afghanistan that connects major cities
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together. It is an artery for trade and commerce for the nearly 300,000 residents in Zabul, as well
as one of the few improved paved roads in the country (Partlow, 2010). Highway 1 bisects Zabul
province and is a key section in connecting Kandahar to Kabul. The Hwy also supports both
civilian traffic and large logistical convoys for coalition support coming from Pakistan moving to
Kandahar. It is a major supply route (MSR). To accomplish their mission the Romanian forces
conducted patrols and COIN operations with the villages that were near the highway from
several forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outpost (COPs).
Romanian forces in Afghanistan are an example of traditional doctrine utilized in CIED
efforts. They patrolled a heavily IED infested sections of road, yet had considerably fewer
casualties than U.S. Forces operating within the same province. Over the course of 2010
Romanian forces suffered six casualties to IEDs where as U.S. Forces suffered 21 to IEDs over
the same time period (iCasualties.org, 2015).
Differences in observed outcomes between U.S. and Romanian forces raise a basic
question. Why was a technologically less advanced force less prone to casualties at the hand of
the IED than the technologically superior force?
Observation of several Romanian patrols as well as several U.S. Convoys and patrols
yielded several observed differences in approaching the IED threat. While all coalition forces to
include the United States follow a similar counter IED strategy as out lined in Allied Joint
Publication (AJP) 3.15(B) (NATO, 2012), the basic patrolling techniques in particular, utilized
and executed by the Romanians seem to have yielded better results. Romanian soldiers on
patrols and convoys would stop and dismount soldiers to investigate all perceived danger areas.
This included culverts, disturbed ground, new trash, anything that seemed out of place they
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would dismount four to six soldiers to visually inspect and clear the terrain prior to remounting
and proceeding on the patrol. Their actions are basic doctrinal procedures covered under
“Actions at danger areas (mounted)” found within FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Platoon and
Squad(FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, 2007).
In contrast, U.S. Forces observed in convoys and patrols did not stop as frequently to
investigate what the Romanians or doctrine considered a danger area, while this is too found
within FM 3-21.8 it is a less cautious approach. It seemed the convoys instead choose to rely on
their vehicular blast resistance as a countermeasure. The benefits of the Romanian, utilizing a
more cautious posture ensures the route is quite rigorously screened for hazards resulting in
temporary safe and clear route, but with the down side of slower patrol speed. Consistently
stopping investigating all danger areas adds considerable amount of time to a patrol. Based on
casualties the old adage “speed is security” many not hold true in the case of IEDs no matter how
thick your armor.
Can something as simple as selection of movement posture, techniques, tactics and
procedures lead to a drastic reduction in casualties? The Romanian selection of a cautionary
movement posture, commensurate with the doctrine outlined in FM 3-21.8 producing relatively
low casualty rates would seem to indicate this possibility. This research will explore the
possibility of utilizing the clearance procedure within FM 3.21.8 soldier based visual search
techniques as a potential mechanism for casualty reduction.
This chapter covered the problem of the IED, as well as the definitions of the IED and
types of IEDs used. Highlighting historical examples of doctrine and knowledge of improvised
munitions as well as some of the issues soldiers faced in previous conflicts. Finally, the

10

motivation for reducing casualties introduced the research focus on comparing CIED procedures
in an effort to reduce IED based casualties.
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CHAPTER TWO: CIED LITERATURE REVIEW & IDENTIFICATION
FOR NEEDED RESEARCH
JIEDDO
In 2006, after taking substantial casualties coupled with strategic and tactical loss to the
IED, DOD Directive (DoDD) 2000.19E instituted the JIEDDO to coordinate DOD efforts in
dealing with the continuing IED threat (Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E, 2006).
JIEDDOs official mission defined in DoDD 2000.19E is as follows: “The JIEDDO shall focus
(lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of the Combatant
Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat Improvised Explosive
Devices as weapons of strategic influence” (Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E, 2006, p.
2). Figure 2 Illustrates the IED effects at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels.
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IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE EFFECTS

Figure 2: IED effects (JP 3-15.1: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations, 2012)

The establishment of JIEDDO transforming a mere 12-person taskforce that tackled the
CIED effort, into a three-star command overseeing, a 3900 person organization that immediately
reported to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) injected bureaucratic hurdles in the
fight (Ellis, Rogers, & Cochran, 2007; Weisgerber, 2013). Ellis notes that as JIEDDO ballooned
into a large organization with multiple levels of management, one of the side effects of becoming
a larger organization was a reduction in organizational agility in responding to battlefield
changes and needs. Despite the organizational hurdles, JIEDDO’s continued focus was on
13

fielding technical equipment with the vast amount of resources going to DtD and AtN based
initiatives (Ellis et al., 2007; JIEDDO, 2011).
The creation of this joint task force was in part an effort to stop parallel efforts by the
different services, effectively wasting DoD resources by each branch of service producing
parallel efforts in the fight against IEDs (Solis et al., 2010). Examples of parallel developments
are the Counter-IED Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) systems, and MRAP development.
Prior to JIEDDO, each service developed their own vehicular based jamming system as a result
the DUKE (Army), ACORN, WARLOCK and CHAMELEON (Marine Corps) were all fielded.
14,000 jamming systems of various types were developed and deployed well after JIEDDO was
established (Wilson, 2007).
Despite the focus of JIEDDO leading, advocating, and coordinating the CIED effort it
does not have the authority to limit or stop on going acquisitions that may or may not be in line
with the CIED fight (Carr, 2011). This lack of authority on JIEDDOs part will lead to continued
parallel efforts tailored to the sponsoring services perceived need. As of 2011, a centralized
database for CIED initiatives was yet to be established; however, efforts were ongoing to make
such a database a reality in order to synchronize collective DOD wide CIED efforts (Solis,
2009).
This newly formed organization attacked the IED problem by establishing three lines of
effort or lines of operation (LOO). The three LOOs are Attack the Network (AtN), Defeat the
Device (DtD), and Train the Force (TtF). Theoretically, all of the lines contribute to the IED
threat and are equal however; in terms of expenditure, AtN and DtD take the lion’s share of the
resources (JIEDDO, 2008, 2009, 2011). The focus of this paper resides mainly in the domains of
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Defeat the Device and Train the Force. As the LOOs act as a three-legged stool, an AtN
overview is also necessary to illustrate the effects of that LOO on the other two.

Attack the Network
AtN is the line of operation that targets the IED maker, financier, trainers, and other key
infrastructure components critical to enabling the IED. In other words, AtN is an offensive set of
operations that target the enemy’s ability to resource, manufacture, and distribute (employ) IEDs.
Disruption occurs by eliminating or limiting funding, controlling certain material goods used in
the construction of IEDs such as fertilizer, neutralizing training experts, and key players within
the network (JIEDDO, 2012).
To interdict in IED creation and employment on the battlefield, attacking the IED
network on all levels is necessary. The easiest way to prevent an IED is to prevent its creation
and subsequent employment (Garaux, 2009). In disrupting the network, a positive occurrence is
the prevention of strategic victories for the enemy. For instance, if an MRAP strikes and IED but
has no casualties with little damage done, it potentially remains a strategic victory for the enemy.
The local populous sees the enemy as having the ability to strike at will against coalition forces
and host nation forces, degrading confidence in their ability to protect them. Furthermore, the
enemy in turn can use this attack as propaganda. If images of the attack are available, they are
easily distributable across the internet for recruitment purposes as well as an attempt to erode the
popular will in coalition countries.
AtN LOO focus is intelligence and collection platforms that enable targeting and
disruption of the networks on the operational and tactical levels. Intelligence focuses are CIED
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intelligence, weapons technical intelligence, persistent surveillance, reconnaissance, information
operations (IO), counter-bomber targeting, IED technical and forensic exploitation, and disposal
of unexploded ordinance (Vane & Quantock, 2011). To assist in these focus areas the
development of multiple aerial and terrestrial sensors have aided in building a common operating
picture and allowing intelligence officers to track and target IED networks. DoD directive
5205.15E established the DOD Forensic Enterprise charged with maintain a global forensic
capability. This capability includes a biometrics database as well as in theater forensic lab
capability. These strategic assets along with soldiers equipped with biometric collection devices,
and forensics data such as finger prints and DNA collected at blast sites, allow for individual
targets are identified (Eisler, 2012). These are examples of just a few of the many efforts that
JIEDDO is pursing in the AtN domain.
AtN is an important, if not the most important LOO with respect to defeating the
insurgencies weapon of choice on the strategic level (Eisler, 2012). AtN has double the funding
of TtF however, is considerably less than DtD (JIEDDO, 2008, 2009, 2011). Denying the
resourcing, manufacture, employment of IEDs degrades the insurgent’s capability to gain
strategic success. The lack successful attacks aids coalition forces greatly in gaining the
confidence of the local population perception of protection. Perception of protection is important.
A population that feels protected and has more confidence in his or her host nation police and
military, thus the populous is more likely to aid the coalition forces. A populous that does not
have such confidence is less likely to aid the coalition (Garaux, 2009). Attack the network is an
important piece of building populous confidence in host nation and coalition forces by
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identifying and defeating IED networks, it adds stability and reduces fear among the local
populous by reducing both attack frequency and real danger within a local area.

Defeat the Device
DtD is the line of operation providing equipment to successfully detect and neutralize
IEDs before they detonate or mitigate the effects of the detonation at the point of attack to ensure
freedom of movement and safer operations (JIEDDO, 2012). These activities are enabled by
rapid identification, development, acquisition, and delivery of capabilities for route clearing,
device and explosive detection, improved EOD robots, and better vehicle and personnel
protections. Clearly, this pillar definition describes technology as the means to defeat the IED.
Note that most of the language in the description is defensive in nature.
DtD accounts for the majority of JIEDDO’s efforts in terms of monetary outputs
(JIEDDO, 2008, 2009, 2011). The DtD focus is based in technological solutions. Many of the
initiatives within this domain focus on detection and neutralization at a safe standoff distance
(Vane & Quantock, 2011). Defeat the device initiatives range from directed energy weapons to
blast resistant underwear. DtD highlights for 2008 included the Ahura hand held homemade
explosives detector, lapeer and terrapin culvert denial systems, Husky mounted detection system
(armored mine detector), interrogation arms for MRAPs, updated jammers, combat tracker dogs
and the Marcbot/Xbot robots for convoys and patrols (Benson, 2012).
Despite the billions of dollars spent in the defeat the device domain, many of the devices
fielded have yet to increase the detection rate of IEDs. The average detection rate hovers around
50 percent even with the U.S. best technological efforts (Benson, 2012). Many of the
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technologies fielded such as the Self Contained Reconnaissance Vehicle (RECCE I) attempt to
integrate self-contained optical and robotic deployment systems to allow all of the occupants to
stay in the vehicle remotely investigating suspected trouble areas (JIEDDO, 2008). By deploying
technologies like this however, removes one of the best detection systems off the battlefield, the
soldier.

Train the Force
TtF aims to mitigate the effects of enemy IED employment through the comprehensive
training of US forces deploying to threat areas. Training should ensure that deployed troops are
aware of the IED threat in their operational area and have an understanding of their missions,
functions, and responsibilities, as well as the capabilities of their equipment to mitigate the
effects of an IED attack (JIEDDO, 2012) .
The Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) is the lead organization within JIEDDO
supporting TtF. JCOE is responsible for developing training efforts to enable units deploying to
theaters of operation the skills necessary to operate CIED technologies in addition to the predeployment training on IED technical capabilities and enemy techniques, tactics, and procedures.
Training development is another focus, in an effort to ensure soldiers properly employ their
CIED equipment and understand its capabilities against the IED (JIEDDO, 2009). Examples of
some of the various training initiatives conducted by JIEDDO are the Tactical Site Exploitation
(TSE); Home Station Training Lanes (HSTLs) JIEDDO funded the creation of CIED training
lanes on 57 different installations, and the Mobile CIED Interactive Trainer (MCIT), which
provides self-paced, adaptable, interactive CIED training for a unit’s expected area of operation.
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MCITs focus is awareness about IED components, employment strategies, and the function and
organization of the IED network (JIEDDO, 2009)

Soldier Detection Based Research
Detection is key in defeating the device. Even with sophisticated sensors and detection
devices, mounted patrols have a 41% chance of discovering the IED, while a dismounted patrol
has nearly double that at 79% chance (Vanden Brook, 2011). The dismounted success may not
be a mystery, doctrine from WWII, Vietnam, and current publications all point to carful, trained
observation, as a premier method of detection (FM 5-31 Boobytraps, 1965; Jones, 2004).
Despite the phenomenal detection capability of the human eye, very few of the 1800+ initiatives
overseen by JIEDDO focus or allocate resources to support solider based detection efforts. Those
research efforts based on soldier detection however have yet to measure the effectiveness of
doctrine.

ROC - IED
The Recognition of Combatants: Counter Improvised Explosive Device (ROC-IED) is
one effort that focuses on soldier identification. This program spawned out of the successful
computer training program Recognition of Combatants: Vehicles (ROC-V) which aided soldiers
in learning the thermal and optical signatures of vehicles, highlighting the unique signatures and
patterns when viewing through a forward looking inferred (FLIR) and day optics (Pettitt,
Redden, Turner, & Carstens, 2009). Based on the success of ROC-V, JIEDDO contracted
Communications Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center’s (CERDEC)
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Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (NVESD) to develop a training program with a
similar approach to the IED threat (Pettitt et al., 2009).
The curriculum for this digital training tool is reflective of a Counter Explosives Hazards
Course taught at Ft. Lenordwood, Missouri. JIEDDO contracted the Army Research Institute
(ARI) to evaluate the effectiveness of the ROC-IED as digital learning tool. The tool based on
the recognition of combatants teaches course material related to CIED procedures and activities.
ARI measured the use of the tool as a standalone training aid for subject matter experts (SME)
trained in the Counter Explosives Hazards Course, as well as a supplementary tool. 81 soldiers
were divided into three groups one which received training only using the ROC-IED program,
one group received instructor led training, and the third group received a combination of the two.
The objective of the study compared the effectiveness of the ROC-IED as a standalone
and supplementary training aid. To test the effectiveness of the training ARI conducted three
tests with the participants of the study. The first two tests consisted of a mounted and dismounted
patrol lanes with simulated IEDs along their route and designed to assess the soldiers’ ability to
recognize IED indicators and to recognize and detect IEDs (Pettitt et al., 2009). The third test
was written, designed to test knowledge on IED components, emplacement techniques, and IED
principals (Pettitt et al., 2009).
The dismounted lane was a 400-meter lane divided into four 100-meter sections; each
participant had four minutes to identify IEDs and IED hazards while moving around the
dismounted lane. A horn started each subsection of the dismounted lane. The mounted lane
consisted of three participants in three Humvees with an observer controller in the passenger seat
and the Student in the turret cupola. As hazards were identified by the student the OC would be
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notified and not the identification. Of note, the vehicular speed for the test was 15 MPH, which is
much slower than typical mounted patrols and convoys. For both the mounted and dismounted
lanes, six actors dressed appropriately for the operational environment at the time of the test.
These actors represented civilians on the battlefield (COB) and were geographically spread out
along both lanes. Some actors were possible indicators while others performed everyday
mundane tasks.
ARI’s study while important in gathering information about knowledge retention and and
measuring the effectiveness of different instruction methods in CIED training, it did not measure
nor test doctrine or measure the effectiveness of CIED procedures. Soldiers walked one at a time
down the dismounted lane and driven around the mounted lane with the task of identifying IEDs
and IED hazards; however they did not complete these tasks as collective entities, which they
would do in a combat scenario. Doctrinal approaches, such as those executed at the squad and
platoon levels are absent in this study, as detection and knowledge retention focused on the
individual moving linearly not accounting for clearing procedures or proper maneuver as applied
to a danger area.

Combat Hunter
The Marine Corps Combat Hunter is a program that focuses on perceptual skills of
individuals. The program centers on increasing the soldiers ability to perceive and interpret a
wide range of stimuli (Schatz, 2011). Examples of perceptual training that occur in a normal
training regimen are marksmanship, IED detection training, and of course the Combat Hunter
course (Schatz, 2011). The Combat Hunter course does not specifically focus on IED detection
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but builds on developing higher order cognitive skills that are applicable throughout the
battlespace. By improving these skills, one gains efficiency in cognitive tasks such as IED
detection. Specifically, Combat Hunter trains techniques for improvement in situational
awareness, sense making, mental simulation and dynamic decision making (Schatz, 2011). While
this program does not address CIED doctrine or efforts, it does offer individuals the potential to
improve one’s detection capability.

Gap in Research
JIEDDO has come under criticism for mismanagement of billions of dollars in funding
and its insatiable pursuit of technology and a lack of overall strategy in the CIED fight
(Sadowski, 2008; Solis, 2009). The overall pursuit of technology has made its way into doctrine.
Training and Doctrine Commands efforts in aiding in the CIED fight, created FM 3-34.114 “IED
Defeat” which like many other efforts, shifted noticeably from a soldier-centric main effort,
toward the techno-centric, in hopes of quickly defeating the threat (Adamson, 2007). The shift in
doctrinal approaches has consequences, as pre-deployment training focuses on CIED equipment
operation and reactionary tasks (See Annex A), a belief that technological means and vehicle
armor is the best protection to soldiers has developed. The belief in equipment superiority has led
to the erosion of sound doctrinal procedures. The focus on technological solution and protective
mechanisms has likely decreased both tactical ability and creativity. This focus has led to a an
un-intended consequence in which the force contradicts current counter insurgency guidance and
doctrine simply by utilizing the most current protective equipment (Good, 2010).
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Another glaring issue with the efforts in the CIED fight are the lack of metrics to measure
the effectiveness of CIED initiatives (Government, 2009). The lack of baseline metrics to
compare the various efforts effectiveness, make the techno-centric strategy difficult to evaluate.
Many have asked the question “is technology this the right course” while there is without a doubt
that some of the efforts have saved lives, without a strategic vision and methods measure
success, efforts will continue to fall short of “defeating” the IED (Ellis et al., 2007).
Some suggested alternative solutions to the IED threat are reengaging training efforts
while focusing on basic maneuver techniques, tactics, and procedures with less focus on
technological devices (Benson, 2012, p. 19; Good, 2010). Lt. General Michael Otes a former
director of JIEDDO has said “the best bomb detectors are still working dogs and handlers, local
informants, and the trained soldiers eye”, despite this revelation, testing of soldier-centric
doctrine, such as that found in FM 3-21.8 is almost nonexistent (Cary & Youssef, 2011 updated
2014). Research in CIED has focused on technological innovations such as sensors,
neutralization capabilities, and sophisticated software that can conduct pattern analysis. While
research exists such as ROC-IED, Combat Hunter, and Mobile Counter IED Trainer (MCIT) is
receiving significant funding aimed with the hope of improving individual detection ability,
lacking is a link between this enhanced ability and maneuver doctrine.
Apparent Romanian success by using the “stop and search” procedure like that of
doctrine such as that found in FM 3-21.8 suggest that an investigation into the effectiveness of
older “soldier centric” doctrine and procedures is warranted. Romanian forces’ casualty rates are
extremely low, while utilizing the very equipment that U.S. forces deemed unfit for force
protection. Romanian successes rely upon the soldier’s ability to detect, not the ability of their

23

equipment to absorb and deflect a blast. Studying the effectiveness of basic CIED procedures
and visual clearance techniques additionally provides a base metric in which to compare the
effectiveness of the many technological innovations fielded.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
Purpose of Research
Despite being the most technologically sophisticated and equipped force on the planet,
U.S. Forces within Zabul province suffered more casualties due to IED’s than their less
technologically equipped Romanian ally during 2010 (iCasualties.org, 2015). The question as to
why this occurred remains unanswered. The purpose of this research is to develop and
implement a methodology to assess competing CIED procedures as a possible explanation to the
observed outcomes. As a thesis, the scope of the research is limited to a simulation investigation
of two different mounted platoon and squad-level CIED procedures. The research will not
address other means to counter IED’s such as different equipment, training, or higher-level
doctrine. Further, the scope of the simulation of platoon and squad operations will be severely
limited. Assumption and scope limitations are discussed in detail below but include the
following: day operations, fixed weather conditions, default IED models, and default sensors.
Hence, the primary outcome of the research will be methodology to investigate the two research
questions posed below. Additional outcomes include possible magnitude of contributing factors
to CIED success, improved understanding of some of the potential shortcomings in current CIED
efforts and practices, and emergent potential solutions or paths of research that lead to CIED
further improvements.
The United States has often relied on technology to establish dominance on the
battlefield. The M1A1 tank of Desert Storm fame is but one example. Nevertheless,
technological solutions do not always appear to deliver the dominance sought. From a
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technology perspective, the perceived failure of the HMMWV to adequately protect troops from
IED’s spurred a frantic search for technological solutions. United States spent nearly 75 billion
dollars on CIED efforts since 2006. Despite this gargantuan expenditure, mounted patrols have
maintained roughly a 50 percent strike to find ratio, even with the latest technology available
being rapidly fielded (Benson, 2012; Zoroya, 2013). Failures of devices such as the Joint IED
Neutralizer (JIN) which was fielded to Afghanistan but never worked and the lack of overall
program tracking have led to inquiries into the management of such large scale financially large
projects. Cases such as the JIN illustrate the constant focus for finding the next technological
silver bullet to defeat the IED (Atkinson, 2007). The pursuit of technological solutions to counter
the IED threat has produced the MRAP a successful vehicle possessing increased protections
available to the soldier as compared to un-armored and flat-bottomed vehicles, however these
protections came at the cost of canalization and being road bound, ultimately providing
predictability for the enemy. Choosing a random path, quite literally, the road not traveled is in
many instances simply not feasible due to the gargantuan size, center of gravity, and weight of
the MRAP blast resistant family of vehicles. The Army’s own Programmatic Environmental
Assessment (PEA), which studies the suitability of the vehicle in training environments, as well
as assess it overall environmental impact, states:
“Because of its weight and reduced off road mobility the majority of MRAP vehicles
missions will be conducted on roads (approximately 75-85%). The remaining 1525% of off road travel will be where most of the impact occurs”
While this assessment refers to the environmental impact for U.S. Training areas, the
acknowledgement of constrained mobility is directly relatable with the vehicle in combat
operations. Especially for operations in countries such as Afghanistan in which mobility for even
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the HMMWV is severely constrained due to terrain. This self-imposed canalization of operations
to roadways, due to equipment limitation, likely exposes soldiers to a higher probability of strike
due to route predictability. This effectively allows the enemy to be more efficient in terms of
effective weapons placement especially with victim-operated devices such as pressure plates.
The DoD and Army have pledged to continue development of blast resistant vehicles.
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) production is underway with a contract awarded to
Oshkosh Truck to build 17,000 at $6.7 billion dollars with an option to build 55,000 amounting
to $30 billion dollars. These vehicles will eventually replace the entire HMMWV fleet. Using
lessons learned from Afghanistan, the JLTV is significantly lighter and more capable off road
than the previous MRAP family of vehicles (Vanden Brook, 2015). Despite being lighter than
the previous generations of MRAPs, the JLTV is nearly three times the curb weight of the
HMMWV at 14,000 (Gallagher, 2015).
While the MRAP does and the JLTV will afford higher survivability rates than the
HMMWV, even a strike in which no fatalities occur, can be an Information Operation (IO) or
propaganda victory.
Anecdotally, it appears as the difference in approaching the IED threat between U.S.
Forces and the Romanian Army rests in a difference in mounted, platoon and squad-level CIED
procedure. Despite having the mission of keeping the only paved road in Afghanistan trafficable
through Zabul Province, the Romanian Army was effective in mitigating the IED threat.
Contrasting with the U.S. forces, the Romanian forces in particular employed procedures that
stopped and cleared a danger area using individual soldiers as visual sensors.
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This research focuses on the mounted, platoon and squad-level CIED procedures as based
on observations of both the Romanian and U.S. mounted, platoon and squad-level CIED
procedures. Given the unique difference between the two procedures, the research focuses on
comparing and contrasting the visual detection capabilities of the two different methodologies.
Within the research questions, platoon and squad-level CIED procedures conducted by the
Romanian Army are referred to as “stop and search” procedure. The platoon and squad-level
CIED doctrine observed being used by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan is referred to as “drive
through” procedure. The difference between the two procedures rests on vehicle speed, and
sensor field. The “stop and search” procedure has a deeper sensor field than “drive through”
procedure. The “stop and search” enables dismounted squad members time to visually detect a
possible IED. The “drive through” procedure for mounted, platoon and squad-level operations
focused on maintaining higher speeds. This meant moving at high rates of speed, which
obviously degraded the ability of vehicle crews to detect possible IED’s. The implicit assumption
of speed was that the inherent level of protection of the vehicle to withstand an IED detonation
would save vehicle lives while the potential loss of one vehicle would not damage overall
operations. While obviously increasing the probability of a successful IED strike on a lead
vehicle, the “drive through” procedure enabled the patrol to maintain vehicle speed and
maneuver capability. .
To clarify the Romanian use of the “stop and search procedure” highlighted within this
research are commensurate with U.S. written doctrine as found in FM 3-21.8. The “drive
through” procedure employed by observed U.S. Forces is also found within FM 3-21.8 however
assumes a less cautious posture. While the majority of the observed U.S. patrols chose a less
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cautious posture found within doctrine, ultimately the suggested posture to approach a danger
area found within the FM is but a guideline and use of specific techniques, tactics, and
procedures are at the discretion of the executing on-ground commander unless specified at a
higher echelon.
While a separate hypothesis not investigated by this thesis, the reason for the
inconsistency between observed procedure choice and written doctrine may be the result of
confusion of platoon and squad tactics developed to deal primarily with IEDs and complex
ambushes within urban terrain in Iraq. Use of IEDs within urban terrain are characterized by
enemy tactics that include various command IED detonation methods often followed by complex
ambushes. Complex ambushes are intended to destroy forces such as an entire squad, platoon, or
convoy that are larger in size than a single vehicle. Complex ambushes involve not only IED
detonation but also direct fire and other anti-personnel weapons directed at an entire convoy,
patrol, or defending force rather than simply a lead vehicle. In complex ambushes, an IED
detonation may initiate the ambush to stop the lead vehicle and thereby stop a convoy making the
entire convoy a target. Defense against a complex ambush may be best accomplished through
maneuver and the firepower of those maneuvering elements. Hence, the emphasis on vehicle
speeds and maneuvers. Some of the success in countering complex ambushes and other
successful CIED techniques in Iraq, an area with concentrated urban sprawl, may have led to the
decreasing use in Afghanistan of the “stop and search” procedure. This research does not address
the above hypothesis about the reasons for the differences in the CIED procedure choice, but
rather the consequences of the two procedures.
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Research Questions
Research Question: Is the “stop and search” procedure more effective in IED detection and
casualty prevention than the “drive through” procedure?
Hypothesis: 1
H0: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is equally as effective as the “drive through” CIED
procedure at detecting the IED threat.
Ha: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat to that of
the “drive through” CIED procedure.
Hypothesis 2
H0: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is equally as effective as the “drive through” CIED
procedure preventing casualties.
Ha: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is more effective at preventing casualties to that of the
“drive through” CIED procedure.

Assumptions
MAK VR Forces provides a high fidelity environment to accomplish threat detection as
modeled according to the fundamental doctrine found with in FM 3-21.8 and that of the observed
field based doctrine. 1600 runs of both models provide a significant base for statistical analysis;
enabling a comparison between models and identifying visual detection efficiencies with respect
to fundamental doctrine and observed field doctrine. The sensors provided with VR Forces are of
adequate fidelity and resolution to make recommendations for further research. The Navy, Army,
and Air force currently use MAK VR Forces in several different simulation platforms. JIEDDO
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also has collaborated and used MAKs software for research and development (MAK, 2015a).
VR Forces coupled with MAK Logger is a suitable experimentation platform to perform visual
detection analysis.

Scope and Limitations
The experiment will be limited to the default sensors and models that are available within
VR Forces. The approach section of this chapter notes the few modifications to the default
models and sensors. As a commercial off the shelf solution VR Forces features a wide variety of
simulation capability. Some of these capabilities will be purposely limited to reduce the number
of variables affecting the outcome of visual detection. One such variable, artificially fixed for the
experiment, is weather. VR Forces has the capability to seed random weather patterns for
scenarios, for this experiment the same weather profile, as well as the same time of day is
standard for all simulation runs. This ensures the luminescence profiles and atmospheric
conditions are not a variable factor between runs. Since luminescence profile and atmospheric
conditions along with sensors influences probability of detection, the choice to limit the profile
and conditions limits the extensibility of conclusions from the Mak portion of the research to
those selected luminescence profiles and atmospheric conditions.
The scenario is limited in the number of participants and to activities of those participants
shortly before encountering a danger area or IED, and does not attempt to replicate a full tactical
response. For instance, if the IED detonates the model does not follow through with a cordon of
the area, furthermore if a detection occurs the vehicle or soldier that detected the object stops and
signals to the other entities to stop ending the scenario. EOD and Sapper actions are absent from
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the models, after an entity detects a threat such as the IED, for the purposes of this experiment
the threat is considered neutralized. The intent of the models is not to replicate a full-fledged
tactical scenario, but rather to capture outcomes from the two doctrines of clearing danger areas
and comparing the effectiveness of the doctrines.
This experiment is a simulation in its entirety. This in itself is somewhat of a limitation.
Past experiments modeling combat operations have shown that modeling can provide generally
accurate models for combat; however, some tasks when compared to live testing do not fully
correlate (Proctor & Paulo, 1996). Fully simulated experiments are a useful tool in reducing risk
associated and predicting potential outcomes with live and virtual trials. Funding, participant
pool, and time have necessitated a fully simulated experiment; however, the .goal of this
experiment is not to provide a definitive solution to the IED problem. A goal of the experiment is
identify a potential solution by providing evidence prompting further research and study. The
models created while in a full constructive environment will facilitate this goal.
Visual scanning is currently not available within MAK VR Forces by default though the
visual sensors are configurable to constrain the visual field to a frustum of less than the default
360 degrees. By implementing a frustum each visual field has 120 degrees of horizontal view,
with vertical restrictions, all of which are in line with MIL STD 1472G. Limitations include the
primary fovea, peripheral fields are not discriminated, and the inability to scan with an optimal
field of view limits realism of the result.
Variability in size, shape, and placement of an IED can influence probability of detection.
The IED model default to MAK VR Forces is one representing a modified 155 mm artillery
round. Having a consistent object model is useful as a control for analysis of the two models but
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again limits extensibility of results. This 155 mm is the only IED included within the VR Forces
4.2.2 package. In reality, IEDs range from ones in a soda can, to cars chalked with explosives.
Vehicle damage is not a variable for this experiment. MRAPs provide superior blast
resistance on the battlefield, thus damage taken by vehicles is not the focus of this experiment.
The focus is on the techniques used to identify IEDs before a strike. To eliminate sensor position
as a variable, both models will feature the same vehicular test platform. Both damage and
destruction tally the same; both instances count as a strike or in essence a failure to detect prior
to initiation. One vehicular model represents vehicles on both doctrine models to eliminate
sensor position as a variable.

Approach
A comparison of the two doctrines is possible by modeling the two approaches within
MAK VR Forces 4.2. The models created are identical with respect to IED placement and route.
In many respects this experiment is similar in design to the IED lane noted within the ROC
CIED study conducted by the Army Research Institute (Pettitt et al., 2009). While the ROC lane
was a live simulation and had multiple threats, the models constructed for this experiment
resemble a segment of that lane in its entirety.
Each lead vehicle modeled in VR Forces for this experiment contains three human visual
sensors per vehicle to detect threats. The sensors represent the diver, passenger, and gunner
positions. Should one of the sensors detect an IED, the vehicles in the patrol will stop assuming
IED neutralization and ending the scenario. Should the IED not be detected or detected too late,
the IED potentially can destroy the vehicle, miss or damage the vehicle, or not be triggered. To
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model the “stop and search” procedure in VR Forces, a box is used to indicate a “danger area”
this trigger initiates a script to dismount troops to conduct a visual search to clear the danger area
containing the IED. The box trigger represents a perceived danger area, it is necessary as the
visual sensors only detect objects within the database. The box is a realistic choice as trash and
debris can be indicators of a danger area. Any specified entity within the database is capable of
fulfilling the same role as the box. The “drive through” procedure model does not react to the
box as trigger to dismount troops. The box is present though it is not required for the “drive
through” procedure, as dismounted visual clearance is not part of this model. The lack of
reaction to the box does not increase or decrease the probability of success or failure of the
outcome it. Likewise, “stop and search” procedure model, if the troops do not detect the IED or
detect it too late, they are killable, or if the vehicles do not detect the box representing the danger
area, they will continue on the route exposing the mounted patrol to the IED threat much like the
drive through model. Figure 3 is a visual representation of the route.
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Figure 3: Route for procedure models

.
HMMWV with M2 is the model used to represent vehicles within the experiment. This
model is a default model within VR Forces. By utilizing the same vehicular model in both
doctrinal approaches, sensor locations are the same, eliminating sensor location as a variable.
The MRAP model within VR Forces is not a 3D model and is generic vehicle shape with a heavy
armor destruction profile. This heavy armor profile is available to the HMMWV with M2 model
enabling the same protection level for the model.

35

The default visual sensor within VR Forces has a 360 field of view. Additionally by
default, the visual sensor locations on the models are located exactly in the center of the models.
The “Human Visual Sensor” a modification to the default visual sensor applies a more accurate
visual sensing capability through the use of a frustum limiting the field of view to specifications
denoted in MIL STD 1472G (D. o. Defense, 2012, p. 89). In addition, each vehicle contains three
human sensors denoted by the top three green dots, representing the driver, passenger, and
gunner (FIGURE 7). These three sensors were purposely located at the illustrated marks and
represent accurate sensor location. The complete default sensor file and the “human sensor file
are located in APPENDIX B.
The visual sensor determines that the level of information that is available about sensed
objects by calculating Line of Sight (LOS), detected or detectable object signature, and
atmospheric effects on detection. Detection occurs in four stages: detection, classification,
identification, and full knowledge. Movement speed also plays a factor in detection, as target
exposure time to the sensor is a factor in determining the target objects level of detection (MAK,
2015b).
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Figure 4: Mounted “Human” Sensor Locations

The IED in default configuration is a rendering of a 155mm howitzer shell. While not an
ideal representation for all IEDs it is a common munition used in such devices, the small visual
signature of the IED is adequate to measure visual detection between the two methods. The
default IED model found within VR Forces is 1.6 meters long by 1 meter wide, by 1 meter high.
This size is nearly double the actual size of a 155mm artillery projectile. The model size was
reduced to reflect the real world size of the IED with the dimensions of .684022 long by .15798
meters high x .15798 meters wide (Army Ammunition Data Sheets: Artillery Ammunition Guns,
Howitzers, Mortars, Recoilless Rifles, Grenatde Launchers, and Artillery Fuzes (FSC 1310,
1315, 1320, 1390), 1994). Activation of the IED occurs by specifying one of three modes:
proximity, time, and immediate. For proximity mode, a radius in meters is required when arming
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the device. If any entity moves within the specified field than the device will detonate. In terms
of the simulation, the proximity sensor is a collision box. Time mode: requires the operator to
enter a time based on the elapsed simulation time, at the specified time the IED will detonate.
Immediate mode, allows the operator or controller to detonate the IED at any time by selecting
the mode. This is most useful in virtual experimentation, in which human subjects are
representing avatars within the simulation. For the purposes of this experiment, to represent the
most common type of IED or the victim operated IED, the proximity sensor is best suited for this
experiment and is the preferred method of employment.

Target Audience
Target audience for this research is for the smallest maneuver unit to a logistical convoy.
Any element that maneuvers within battle space during a conflict will potentially benefit from
this and future research in this area. Maneuver elements endure most of the IED threat, as such
modeling and researching promising techniques and procedures that increase detection
efficiencies potentially leads to casualty reductions.

Experimental Design and Data Collection Methods
MAK Logger is a program designed to capture both simulation data and playback
simulations. When configured, it outputs log files in text, excel, SQL, and a proprietary logger
format. Logger 5.3.1 is the primary tool in gathering data from the simulations. Logger captures
entity ID, entity type, force ID, location, velocity, acceleration, orientation, angular velocity,
damage state, detonation state (IED only), kill state, immobilization state, any concealment, and
enabled capabilities. Logger also captures system messages such as detection and detection
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levels. By running both the “stop and search” procedure and “drive through” procedure 1600
times, with the data exported into a SQL database from MAK Logger, analysis is possible with
respect to the detection capabilities of the two procedures. A sample plain text logger output file
is in Appendix D. This file highlights the available data for comparison within the SQL database.
Once the data for the two procedures is in the SQL database, an import to SPSS, a
statistical analysis program is possible. SPSS v23 processes and handles all analysis. SPSS is
capable variety of statistical tests for analysis. To answer the question 1, a Mann Whitney U test
concerning the detection variable from both procedures is necessary for comparison. An A priori
test as well as a post hoc power test using G power provides power analysis that will support
either the rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis during analysis.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
This chapter presents the data collected and utilized for analysis for a cumulative of
67,200 runs of the “stop and search” and “drive through” CIED procedure models. The primary
focus of this thesis is to determine what if any impact the use of two different CIED procedures
has on the ability to detect IEDs, avoid strikes or prevent casualties. Comparing the two
procedures - “drive through” and “stop and search” - for strikes and casualties is possible by
analyzing data gained from the simulations. Strikes as well as vehicles destroyed/casualties are
the metrics used for the basis of comparison.
The MAK Logger 5.3.1 recorded simulation run data. From the logger, the data export
feature transferred the data into a SQL database. Data queries from excel into the SQL database
pulled and filtered the data and array the data for analysis by SPSS. SPSS v23.0 GradPack and
G*Power 3.1.9.2 performed all inferential and descriptive statistical analysis.
The principle data extracted for analysis were: (1) detonation PDU (protocol data unit),
(2) force identification, and (3) entity state PDU. The simulation only generates a detonation
PDU when a detonation occurs, this allows for an accurate accounting of the number of
detonations per the number of runs conducted. Likewise, the entity state PDU provided an
effective method to filter and identify totally destroyed vehicles or dead soldiers within the stop
and search model. The entity state PDU differs depending on the entities state and the final PDU
sent within the simulation. The final entity state PDU makes it possible to capture the final state
of all entities within the simulation. Using the final PDU appearance codes, enabled filtering of
simulation data to reflect the number of totally destroyed vehicles and killed entities within each
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respective sample. For the totally destroyed vehicle within the simulation all five-occupant
entities die resulting in five causalities per vehicle destroyed within the “drive through” model
noted in the total potential casualties. In reality, despite total vehicle destruction, the actual
casualty count will vary based on a multitude of factors that this model does not account for.
Because of this disparity, both the raw vehicular destruction frequency and a corrected “potential
casualty count” are reflected in the graphed results (Figure 5).

Statistical Analysis
G*Power 3.1.9.2 enables a priori estimation the initial sample size required for statistical
testing given the required power level (1-beta) at a specified significance level (alpha), and
desired effect size. Post hoc testing using the collected data determines the actual observed
power.
The power estimation and post hoc testing are important in minimizing type 1 and 2
errors. Type 1 error commonly referred to as an alpha error, in which one incorrectly rejects the
null hypothesis. A common control to minimize this type of error is to fix the alpha level
threshold for rejection of the null hypothesis (Diez, Barr, & Cetinkaya-Rundel, 2015). For
instance, the alpha level of this experiment is .05, which gives 95 percent probability that type 1
error did not occur. Type 2 error is known as beta error or the failure to reject an incorrect null
hypothesis. Power (1-beta) and beta complement each other by conducting post hoc analysis, one
can control for type 2 error. To reject the null hypothesis for the research questions, the p-value
should not exceed the alpha threshold of .05 nor should the beta level exceed .20. These
thresholds are based on recommendations made in A Power Primer (Cohen, 1992).
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A priori estimation resulted in a sample size requirement of 134 at an alpha error
probability of .05 and a beta level of .80 for each of the Mann-Whitney U tests. Each planned
comparison contains 3200 samples, which far exceeds the base line requirement determined a
priori.
The experiment contained 67,200 runs composed of 1600 runs of the base case “stop and
search” procedure at the default pace of 6 km per hour and 1600 runs of the “drive through”
procedure at each one-kilometer increments from 10-50 KPH for a total of 41 comparisons with
the base case. Speeds above 50 KPH were not tested. The distance between the curve at the
intersection, road material, and the linear distance to the IED prevented vehicular acceleration
and speed in excess of 51 KPH on a consistent basis.
Data collected on each run enabled comparison of outcomes associated with each
procedure, targeted specifically the number of detonations/strikes, and casualties that occurred.
Entity state and detonation state and their respective sub categories allowed access to a
combination of appearance codes, force identification, and entity marking sets data that enabled
both strike and casualty analysis.
The following paragraphs detail the Mann-Whitney U test statistics and p-values for both
strikes and casualties at a given speed for the drive through procedure compared to the stop and
search procedure. The “drive through” procedure regardless of speed proved to be significantly
different from the “stop and search” procedure. Figure 5 notes the strike and casualty frequencies
for each model and speed. Appendix E contains the actual output from SPSS for each of the
tests.
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Figure 5: Strike and Casualty Frequency
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Inferential Analysis of the Research Questions:
A Mann Whitney U test of the simulated “stop and search” CIED procedure to the “drive
through” CIED procedure for both strikes and casualties at each speed from 10 KPH to 50 KPH
facilitated the inferential analysis of the research question and hypotheses stated below.
Research Question: Is the “stop and search” procedure more effective in IED detection and
casualty prevention than the “drive through” procedure?
Hypothesis:
H0: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is equally as effective as the “drive through” CIED
procedure at detecting the IED threat.
Ha: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat to that of
the “drive through” CIED procedure.
The measure used to evaluate this hypothesis was IED “strikes”
H0: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is equally as effective as the “drive through” CIED
procedure preventing casualties.
Ha: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is more effective at preventing casualties to that of the
“drive through” CIED procedure.
The measures used to evaluate this hypothesis were vehicle destroyed and potential
casualties. As vehicle destroyed is correlated with potential casualties, statistical analysis is
performed primarily on casualties.
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Appendix E contains statistical output for each set of runs. Table 1 summarizes the
statistical outcomes for each set of runs. The first column S & S represents the “stop and search”
procedure while the second represents the “drive through” procedure at the given speed.
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Table 1: Statistical summary of outcomes.
Procedure
Comparison
S&S VS 10 kph
S&S VS 11 kph
S&S VS 12 kph
S&S VS 13 kph
S&S VS 14 kph
S&S VS 15 kph
S&S VS 16 kph
S&S VS 17 kph
S&S VS 18 kph
S&S VS 19 kph
S&S VS 20 kph
S&S VS 21 kph
S&S VS 22 kph
S&S VS 23 kph
S&S VS 24 kph
S&S VS 25 kph
S&S VS 26 kph
S&S VS 27 kph
S&S VS 28 kph
S&S VS 29 kph
S&S VS 30 kph
S&S VS 31 kph
S&S VS 32 kph
S&S VS 33 kph
S&S VS 34 kph
S&S VS 35 kph
S&S VS 36 kph
S&S VS 37 kph
S&S VS 38 kph
S&S VS 39 kph
S&S VS 40 kph
S&S VS 41 kph
S&S VS 42 kph
S&S VS 43 kph
S&S VS 44 kph
S&S VS 45 kph
S&S VS 46 kph
S&S VS 47 kph
S&S VS 48 kph
S&S VS 49 kph
S&S VS 50 kph

Summarized Statistical Outcomes
Mann-Whitney U Test Statistic
Significance
Strike
VehDstry
Strike
VehDstry
1222400.000

1263280.000

0.000000

0.075782

1102400.000

1213360.000

0.000000

0.000000

1034400.000

1168120.000

0.000000

0.000000

942400.000

1127560.000

0.000000

0.000000

874400.000

1080760.000

0.000000

0.000000

672800.000

987160.000

0.000000

0.000000

615200.000

939580.000

0.000000

0.000000

451200.000

863140.000

0.000000

0.000000

412000.000

822580.000

0.000000

0.000000

262400.000

759400.000

0.000000

0.000000

213600.000

732100.000

0.000000

0.000000

153600.000

686080.000

0.000000

0.000000

99200.000

686860.000

0.000000

0.000000

85600.000

698560.000

0.000000

0.000000

72000.000

645520.000

0.000000

0.000000

84000.000

665020.000

0.000000

0.000000

97600.000

674380.000

0.000000

0.000000

114400.000

702460.000

0.000000

0.000000

107200.000

645520.000

0.000000

0.000000

103200.000

654100.000

0.000000

0.000000

109600.000

689200.000

0.000000

0.000000

118400.000

706360.000

0.000000

0.000000

145600.000

740680.000

0.000000

0.000000

126400.000

727420.000

0.000000

0.000000

128800.000

725080.000

0.000000

0.000000

137600.000

737560.000

0.000000

0.000000

129600.000

743800.000

0.000000

0.000000

92000.000

718840.000

0.000000

0.000000

110400.000

754720.000

0.000000

0.000000

122400.000

719620.000

0.000000

0.000000

120000.000

704020.000

0.000000

0.000000

128000.000

739120.000

0.000000

0.000000

131200.000

733660.000

0.000000

0.000000

133600.000

741460.000

0.000000

0.000000

128000.000

738340.000

0.000000

0.000000

125600.000

734440.000

0.000000

0.000000

137600.000

765640.000

0.000000

0.000000

136800.000

711040.000

0.000000

0.000000

146400.000

765640.000

0.000000

0.000000

134400.000

770320.000

0.000000

0.000000

134400.000

766420.000

0.000000

0.000000
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Post Hoc
Beta
Power
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

While individual statistical run outcomes varied, at the experimental design alpha of .05
and beta of .2 statistical significance levels, both null hypotheses may be rejected as the “stop
and search” procedure is statically significantly different and therefore more effective in
detection of the IED threat than the “drive through” procedure. The one exception is for
casualties at 10 KPH. The significance level only compares vehicles destroyed vs the soldiers
killed in the stop and search model, if the assumption that the crew is killed in the drive through
model, then the stop and search model remains more efficient.
Possible explanations for this overall outcome include the “stop and search” procedure
benefits from one more soldier-based sensor than the “drive through” procedure. This additional
sensor potentially increases the probability that detection of the IED will occur in the “stop and
search” procedure over the “drive through” procedure prior to a strike. Additionally the
dismounted formation of “stop and search” procedure enables a broader search area. This
broader search area is due to the physical distance between the four dismounted sensors. The
“drive through” procedure has a narrower search field, as all three sensors are in very close
proximity being roughly one meter apart one the horizontal axis. The broader search coverage of
the “stop and search” model ultimately offers more coverage with a better probability of
detecting a hostile threat.
A second factor that may explain the difference in outcome between the two procedures
is speed. Both models base detection on the size of the object being sensed (IED), LOS and
distance from the object, and object exposure time. With the “stop and search” procedure,
exposure time or time to detect an object is greater than that of the “drive through” procedure. As
speed increases with the drive through procedure, it potentially decreases the exposure time to
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the hostile object, ultimately decreasing the probability of detection. Figure 5 illustrates the
effect of speed on both strikes and casualties.

Regression Analysis
The question surfaces, what if a vehicle moved at a speed faster than 50 kph? Both strikes
and casualties peak at 24 kph and seemed to have an observable negative slope out to 50 KPH.
To explore this further, initially a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to see if 24
KPH and 50 KPH were members of the same distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a
non-parametric test that measures the equality of one-dimension probability distributions. The
test resulted in a p value of 0.044629 for strikes and 0.000001 for vehicles destroyed/casualties.
Since both do not exceed the .05 significance level, we must conclude that 24 KPH and 50 KPH
are not members of the same distribution.
Following this test, a linear regression was conducted using data points between 24 KPH
to 50 KPH. Linear regression is used to show relationship between the dependent and
independent variables. Using known data the linear regression procedure outputs estimated
model parameters. These parameters are derived from essentially a best fit line from the given
data. These model parameters can then be used for form a regression equation with the ability to
predict future outcome with a given independent value. For the purposes of this paper, the given
independent value would be speed.
The regression for strikes from 24 KPH to 50 KPH produced a constant of 1587.205 with
a slope of -2.034. The model summery yielded an R Square value of .496 indicating that speed
accounts for 49.6 percent of the strikes within the regression model. Further, the 95% confidence
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interval for the slope is between -2.878 and -1.189. Figure 6 details the regression results for
strikes.

Figure 6: Strike linear regression coefficient results for speeds 24 to 50 KPH

From the given parameter data, a regression equation to predict strikes at a given speed is
formulated.
Strikes at (Speed) = -2.034 * (Speed)+1587.205
The same process for vehicles destroyed is used. The regression for vehicle destroyed
produced a constant of 959.239 and a slope of -4.805. The model summery R square value was
.650 indicating that speed accounted for 65% of the vehicles destroyed within the regression
model. The 95% confidence interval for slope was wider than that of strikes at -6.258 to -3.353.
Figure 7 details the regression results for vehicles destroyed

Figure 7: Vehicle destroyed linear regression coefficient results for speeds 24 to 50 KPH

From the given parameter data and assuming linearity, a regression equation to predict
vehicles destroyed at a given speed 24 KPH or faster is formulated.
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Vehicles Destroyed at (Speed) = -4.805 *(Speed)+959.239
Assuming linearity, the regression equations both strikes and casualties were calculated
for speeds from 60 KPH to 100 KPH, which is typically faster than the speed tactical vehicles
operate at during military operations in rural Afghanistan. The results of these calculations are
noted in figure 8.
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Figure 8: Strikes and Vehicle destroyed/ casualty predictions based on linear regression
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The results indicate that both strikes and vehicles destroyed are significantly lower at 100
KPH; however, the “Stop and Search” tactic and the “Drive Through” have the same intercept
when the “Drive Through” model reaches an approximate 749 KPH. Vehicles
destroyed/casualties are not as extreme with the intercept occurring at the approximate speed of
196 KPH. These results indicate that speed does not necessarily equate to security with respect to
the IED.
Detailed comparison of each speed is in the following paragraphs below. Each
comparison has two paragraphs describing results one for strikes and one for casualties. Each
series of tests seeks to answer the research question consisting of the same hypotheses. Each test
seeks to answer the same set of hypothesis therefore; they are not repeated within the body of
results for each test.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 10 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 10 KPH, U = 1222400.000, p = .000 the p-value is less
than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null hypothesis. The post hoc power level for
this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection of the null
hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop and search
model is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model at 10 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 10 KPH U = 1263280.000, p = .076 the p-value
is greater than the .05 threshold therefore we must accept the null hypothesis. The post hoc
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power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceeded thus the acceptance
of the null hypotheses is supported. The acceptance of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is not more effective at preventing casualties than the “drive through”
procedure at 10 KPH based on the corrected potential casualties.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 11 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 11 KPH yielding the following: U = 1102400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 11 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 10 KPH yielding the following: U =
1213360.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 11 KPH.
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Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 12 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 12 KPH yielding the following: U = 1034400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 12 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 12 KPH yielding the following: U =
11168120.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the
null hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 12 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 13 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 13 KPH yielding the following: U = 942400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
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and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 13 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 13 KPH yielding the following: U =
1127560.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 13 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 14 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 14 KPH yielding the following: U = 874400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 14 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 14 KPH yielding the following: U =
1080760.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
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exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 14 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 15 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 15 KPH yielding the following: U = 672800.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 15 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 15 KPH yielding the following: U =
1987160.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 15 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 16 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 16 KPH yielding the following: U = 615200.000, p = .000
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the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 16 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 16 KPH yielding the following: U =
939580.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 16 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 17 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 17 KPH yielding the following: U = 451200.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 17 KPH.
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A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 17 KPH yielding the following: U =
863140.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 17 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 18 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 18 KPH yielding the following: U = 412000.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 18 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 18 KPH yielding the following: U =
822580.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
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indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 18 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 19 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 19 KPH yielding the following: U = 262400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 19 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 19 KPH yielding the following: U =
759400.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 19 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 20 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 20 KPH yielding the following: U = 213600.000, p = .000
59

the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 20 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 20 KPH yielding the following: U =
732100.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 20 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 21 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 21 KPH yielding the following: U = 153600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 21 KPH.
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A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 21 KPH yielding the following: U =
686080.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 21 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 22 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 22 KPH yielding the following: U = 99200.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 22 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 22 KPH yielding the following: U =
686860.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
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indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 22 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 23 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 23 KPH yielding the following: U = 85600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The
rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective in
detecting the IED threat than the drive through model at 23 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 23 KPH yielding the following: U =
698560.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 23 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 24 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 24 KPH yielding the following: U = 72000.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
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and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 24 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 24 KPH yielding the following: U =
645520.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 24 KPH.
Statistically 24 KPH proved to be the worse speed in terms of strikes of the entire
experiment.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 25 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 25 KPH yielding the following: U = 84000.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 25 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 25 KPH yielding the following: U =
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665020.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 25 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 26 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 26 KPH yielding the following: U = 97600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 26 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 26 KPH yielding the following: U =
674380.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 26 KPH.
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Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 27 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 27 KPH yielding the following: U = 114400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 27 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 27 KPH yielding the following: U =
702460.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 27 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 28 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 28 KPH yielding the following: U = 107200.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
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and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 28 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 28 KPH yielding the following: U =
645520.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 28 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 29 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 29 KPH yielding the following: U = 103200.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 29 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 29 KPH yielding the following: U =
654100.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
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exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 29 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 30 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 30 KPH yielding the following: U = 109600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 30 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search” procedure than
the “drive through” procedure at 30 KPH yielding the following: U = 689200.000, p = .000 the
p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null hypothesis. The post hoc
power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection of
the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop and
search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the “drive through” procedure
at 30 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 31 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 31 KPH yielding the following: U = 118400.000, p = .000
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the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 31 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 31 KPH yielding the following: U =
706360.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 31 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 32 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 32 KPH yielding the following: U = 145600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 32 KPH.
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A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 32 KPH yielding the following: U =
740680.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 32 KPH

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 33 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 33 KPH yielding the following: U = 126400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 33 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 33 KPH yielding the following: U =
727420.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
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indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 33 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 34 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 34 KPH yielding the following: U = 128800.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 34 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 34 KPH yielding the following: U =
725080.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 34 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 35 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 35 KPH yielding the following: U = 137600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
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hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 35 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 35 KPH yielding the following: U =
737560.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 35 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 36 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 36 KPH yielding the following: U = 129600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 36 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 36 KPH yielding the following: U =
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743800.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 36 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 37 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 37 KPH yielding the following: U = 92000.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 37 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 37 KPH yielding the following: U =
718840.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 37 KPH.
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Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 38 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 38 KPH yielding the following: U = 110400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 38 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 38 KPH yielding the following: U =
754720.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 38 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 39 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 39 KPH yielding the following: U = 122400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
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and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 39 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 39 KPH yielding the following: U =
719620.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 39 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 40 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 40 KPH yielding the following: U = 120000.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 40 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 40 KPH yielding the following: U =
704020.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
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exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 40 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 41 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 41 KPH yielding the following: U = 128000.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 41 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 41 KPH yielding the following: U =
739120.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 41 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 42 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 42 KPH yielding the following: U = 131200.000, p = .000
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the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 42 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 42 KPH yielding the following: U =
733660.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 42 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 43 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 43 KPH yielding the following: U = 133600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 43 KPH.
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A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 43 KPH yielding the following: U =
741460.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective in preventing casualties than the
drive through model at 43 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 44 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 44 KPH yielding the following: U = 128000.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 44 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 44 KPH yielding the following: U =
738340.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
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indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 44 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 45 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 45 KPH yielding the following: U = 125600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 45 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 45 KPH yielding the following: U =
734440.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 45 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 46 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 46 KPH yielding the following: U = 137600.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
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hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 46 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 46 KPH yielding the following: U =
765640.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 46 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 47 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 47 KPH yielding the following: U = 136800.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 47 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 47 KPH yielding the following: U =
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711040.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 47 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 48 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 48 KPH yielding the following: U = 146400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 48 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 48 KPH yielding the following: U =
765640.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 48 KPH.
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Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 49 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 49 KPH yielding the following: U = 134400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 49 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 49 KPH yielding the following: U =
770320.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 49 KPH.

Stop and Search vs Drive Through: 50 KPH
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that strikes were less for “stop and Search” procedure
than the “drive through” procedure at 50 KPH yielding the following: U = 134400.000, p = .000
the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore we must reject the null hypothesis. The post
hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not exceed thus the rejection
of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the “stop
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and search” procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat than the drive through model
at 50 KPH.
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that casualties were less for “stop and Search”
procedure than the “drive through” procedure at 50 KPH yielding the following: U =
766420.000, p = .000 the p-value is less than the .05 threshold therefore, we must reject the null
hypothesis. The post hoc power level for this test was 1.00, the beta threshold of .20 was not
exceed thus the rejection of the null hypotheses is supported. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the “stop and search” procedure is more effective at preventing casualties than the
“drive through” procedure at 50 KPH.
In summation, the “stop and search” procedure is statistically more effective in detection of the
IED threat than the “drive through” procedure at all tested speeds except for casualties at 10 KPH. If the
assumption of a destroyed vehicle equates to all five occupants dying, then the “stop and search”
method remains more efficient at 10 KPH. The “stop and search” procedure benefits from one more
soldier based sensor as well as a broader search area based on the positions of the sensors on the battle
field as compared to the vehicular based “drive through” procedure.
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY
Motivation
The motivation for this research ultimately is an effort to explore two alternative tactical
procedures for countering improvised explosive devices deployed during asymmetric warfare in
Afghanistan-like rural settings. As previously stated IEDs continue to be the number one
casualty producing weapons system on the asymmetric battlefield and will remain so for the near
future. Further, field observations of actual units performing the “stop and search” method on a
routine basis within the context of asymmetric warfare in rural Afghanistan suffered fewer
casualties than their allied counterparts practicing the “drive through” method for a good
majority of their tactical movements. The intent and motivation of this research was twofold.
First was to verify that the anecdotal observations were not a coincidence, and secondly to fill a
gap in research that exists concerning CIED procedures and tactics. The desired outcome of this
research is aiding in a very small way, to a viable solution for this complex problem. Ultimately,
the overall goal would be reducing strikes, increasing detection rates, and contributing to a
significant reduction in casualties. While this research is limited in scope, its basic design is
easily expandable allowing for research that is more complex.

Research Design
In comparing the two procedures, two models evolved from a single synthetic natural
environment modeled in MAK VR Forces 4.2.2. The environment and objects within the
environment are identical. The models differ only in their logic in approaching and searching for
the IED. The “Stop and Search” procedure model reacts to a potential danger area and dismounts
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four soldier based entities to visually clear the suspected danger area. The “drive through”
procedure model does not dismount soldiers but instead relies on driver, passenger, and gunner
based sensors alone to search for IEDs. In both procedure models, the sensors and sensor
capability are identical; however, speed, exposure time, line of sight, and object size all play
apart in recognition and detection of the IED threat. Given that the environments are identical,
but each model applies a different CIED procedure, the outcomes of strikes and casualties
between procedural models are the basis of comparison with respect to detection and casualty
efficiencies.
The basis for the “stop and search” model is doctrine in clearance of a danger area from
FM 3-21.8 and its observed use by allied units in Afghanistan. The “drive through model” is also
representative of doctrine from FM 3-21.8. Both models represent tactical choice available to the
on ground commander. Running the “stop and search” procedural model 1600 times at the base
speed of 6 KPH and the “drive through” procedural model 1600 times at each speed starting with
10 KPH and ending at 50 KPH in one KPH increments, yields a total of 67,200 runs in which
statistical analysis is applied. Each simulation produces a very large set of data. Detonation
PDUs and Entity State PDUs provide the variables for appropriate comparative analysis with
respect to detection and casualty efficiencies. The following section covers the data collection
methodology.

Data Collection
Mak Logger 5.1.3 is the primary data collection tool for this research. The Mak logger
tool captures all simulation traffic within VR Forces via DIS or HLA connection and allows it to
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be either saved as a logger tape format or exported to a SQL database, Access database, or a text
file and example portion of the text file is in Appendix D. All simulations were saved in the
logger format and exported to the appropriate SQL database. Filtering was accomplished using
the SQL query feature found in Microsoft excel.

Data and Analysis Summary
Analysis of the research data accomplished identifying the efficiencies of the procedures
by applying a Mann Whitney U test comparing the “stop and search” CIED procedure to the
“drive through” CIED procedure for both strikes and casualties at each given speed from 10
KPH to 50 KPH. This statistical testing applied to all 67200 runs. This analysis facilitated the
answering of the research question and hypotheses stated below. SPSS v23.0 carried out all
statistical testing except for A priori and post hoc power tests in which G*Power 3.1.9.2
provided analysis. All testing is at a 95% confidence interval with the A priori and post hoc
testing not exceeding a .20 beta level. The A priori ensured that the sample size was large
enough while the post hoc testing aided in controlling type I and type II errors. The analysis
section of this research answered the following questions:
Research Question: Is the “stop and search” procedure more effective in IED detection and
casualty prevention than the “drive through” procedure?
Hypothesis:
H0: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is equally as effective as the “drive through” CIED
procedure at detecting the IED threat.
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Ha: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is more effective in detecting the IED threat to that of
the “drive through” CIED procedure.

H0: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is equally as effective as the “drive through” CIED
procedure preventing casualties.
Ha: “Stop and Search” CIED procedure is more effective at preventing casualties to that of the
“drive through” CIED procedure.

Appendix E contains statistical output for each set of runs. Table 1 summarizes the statistical
outcomes for each set of runs. The first column S & S represents the “stop and search” procedure
while the second represents the “drive through” procedure at the given speed. Figure 5 located in
the previous chapter displays the frequency of outcomes in a graphical format. The “stop and
search” is more efficient in both strikes and casualties than the “drive through” procedure at all
tested speeds except for casualties at 10 KPH as previously noted. Regression data further shows
that increasing speed does not intercept “stop and search” model strikes and casualties until 749
KPH and 196 KPH respectively.

Conclusion
This research and the test results indicate that the “stop and search” procedure reflective
of the doctrine covered in FM 3-21.8 is more effective than the “drive through” procedure. The
“stop and search” model proved significantly more effective when compared to the drive through
model at any given speed except for vehicles destroyed/casualties at 10 KPH. This research is
limited in that it tests a “best case” scenario the results have indicated that procedural choice in
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respect to CIED has consequences. This research illustrates the need to investigate not only the
technological solution but the procedural as well. Though this research and experiment scope
were limited by time and funding, it can be easily expanded to include more complex scenarios
and further the realism of sensor capability with the addition of pug-ins for the software. The
simplicity of this experiment does not diminish the potential of using procedures as an effective
mechanism for reducing both strikes and casualties.
There is without a doubt large amounts of funding for research and development of
technology aimed at countering the asymmetric use of IEDs in battlefields like Afghanistan or
Iraq. Literally billions of dollars have funded attempts to rectify this persistent problem. One
might ask, for all of the monumental effort in trying to design and create technological
countermeasures, has the same focus and effort been expended on doctrine, tactical choice, and
procedures as countermeasures? This analysis supports the notion that doctrine, tactical choice
and procedure as countermeasures are worthy of at least equal emphasis. Further, while there are
programs and equipment being developed to improve detection of soldiers, current and future
equipment sets challenge the usefulness these skills by negating some to the tactical choice. The
mine roller is an example of a piece of equipment that supports the use of the “drive through”
procedure. In addition to this negative tradeoff of sacrificing higher cost mine roller for a lower
cost IED, another potential issue is regular usage of such equipment may create reliance on the
equipment and degrade the critical skills of soldier based visual detection. Historically, in the
U.S. military, there have been instances that in the presence of new technology loss of basic
fighting skills have occurred with devastating consequences.
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The Iran Air Flight 655 is an example of this in that the USS Vincennes shot down a
civilian airliner. The ship was equipped with the Aegis Combat System. This state of the art
newly deployed combat system had a number of flaws including a poor user interface. The crews
reliance on this system and its poor interface ultimately led to a poor decision an ultimately led
to 290 civilian deaths, due to the misidentification of an aircraft by USS Vincennes Agis system
and crew interpretation of presented data (Dotterway, 1992).
The recent capture of two naval patrol vessels by Iran highlights another such instance.
The reliance on GPS within the military has increased dramatically over time (Morgan, 2012).
Such reliance on a technology can lead to traditional skills perishing over time. While GPS is a
technological marvel, technology already exist to disrupt or fool devices by feeding them false
signals (Morgan, 2012). While the capture of the naval vessels based on nefarious signals
causing the onboard GPS to display incorrect information is only speculative, it does highlight
the need to maintain a traditional skill set. If GPS spoofing did occur, tracking navigational
progress via chart, heading, and speed may have at least alerted the crew to a problem.

Limitations and Future Research
There are significant limitations to this research. First, the research evaluates a patrol, not
a convoy, encountering a single IED, not a complex ambush with multiple IEDs and kill zones.
Further, the model represents a surface laid IED, which is arguably easier to spot than a buried
one. Route, road materials, road representations (e.g. straight, curved, incline, declines, gravel,
paved, etc.) are also limitations as there are a plethora of combinations of these attributes and
associated scenarios that can be tested and provide useful information. The main limitation of
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this research is the use of one scenario. For instance in some conditions such as a mountain road
with cliffs and rough terrain visual clearance techniques described within this research may not
be totally feasible and have to be modified to accomplish the desired end state. The methodology
set forth in this research however, is appropriate to test scenario and material variations, given
the time to do the analysis. A scanning feature for the human based entities is lacking within this
research. While a frustum representing the visual field is present and in accordance with MIL
STD 1472G, a scanning algorithm would likely increase the correlation between the simulation
and live testing.
Appropriate future research may include convoys, complex ambushes, buried IEDs, IEDs
of different explosive potential and different explosive types. Further, operations of friendly
forces may vary by speed and vehicle type. Implicitly higher speeds reduce both danger area and
IED detection ability. More complex operations may provide insight into the impact of complex
enemy ambushes and the effects on the scenario described above. This may be mitigated by
friendly UAV’s used to detect potential complex ambushes (Hakola, 2004). Urban operations
may also be modeled with civilian causalities monitored. This research also provides the basis
for future live testing in which real world results are collected and analyzed. Future research
should also include the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station or CROWS II and its
effects on detection. With the CROWS weapons platform already fielded to some units, the
gunner position moves inside the vehicle to a remote viewing station. This in turn removes a set
of soldier based optical sensors from the battlefield. Given the results of this experiment, the
Crows system has the potential to affect the ability to detect danger areas with appropriate
standoff and warrants further research.
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APPENDIX A: PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING (Crawford, 2009, p. 33)
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APPENDIX B: SENSOR FILES
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Default Sensor
(visual-sensor-system
(systems )
(sensors
(visual-sensor
(component-descriptor-type "signature-sensor-descriptor")
(component-type "signature-sensor")
(min-tick-period 2.000000)
(min-tick-period-variance 0.100000)
(tick-period-uses-real-time False)
(process-state-repository-name "")
(process-state-repository-type "")
(is-enabled True)
(detect-only-hostile-forces False)
(detection-types )
(detect-destroyed-objects False)
(sensor-geometry
(in-range
(range $max-range)
)
)
(sensor-domain "visual")
(sensor-offset $sensor-position)
(sensor-positional-error 0.000000)
(detection-level-determinator
(determinator-type "signature-detection-level-determinator")
(detection-level-to-set-hostility 3)
(combat-identification-level-table-file
(filename "$(detection-dir)\std-visual-detection-table.csv")
)
)
)
)
(controllers )
(actuators )
(connections
(connect system:object-types-to-detect visual-sensor:object-types-to-detect)
(connect visual-sensor:detected-objects system:detected-objects)
(connect system:sensor-offset visual-sensor:sensor-offset)
)
(resources )
(meta-data
(system-name "Visual Sensor")
94

(system-description "Allows an entity to detect other objects through visible light.")
(allowed-state-repository-types "all")
(system-categories "sensor")
(parameter-data-list
(vector-parameter-data
(parameter-name "sensor-position")
(variable-type "DtRwOffsetVector")
(display-label "Sensor Location")
(display-units "meters")
(source-units "meters")
(default-value 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000)
(relative-to "")
)
(real-parameter-data
(parameter-name "max-range")
(variable-type "DtRwReal")
(display-label "Maximum Range")
(display-units "meters")
(source-units "meters")
(default-value 4000.000000)
)
)
(meta-data-entry-list
(detect-object-types-input
(detect-object-types-input-port-name "object-types-to-detect")
)
(detected-objects-output
(detected-objects-output-port-name "detected-objects")
)
)
)
)
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Modified Human Sensor File
(visual-sensor-system
(systems )
(sensors
(visual-sensor
(component-descriptor-type "signature-sensor-descriptor")
(component-type "signature-sensor")
(min-tick-period 2.000000)
(min-tick-period-variance 0.100000)
(tick-period-uses-real-time False)
(process-state-repository-name "")
(process-state-repository-type "")
(is-enabled True)
(detect-only-hostile-forces False)
(detection-types
(entity-type 1 (2 2 0 3 1 1 0))
(entity-type 9 (5 1 0 5 17 3 0))
)
(detect-destroyed-objects False)
(sensor-geometry
(and
(in-frustum
(el-max 1.151917) ;; 60 degrees in az and 66 up and 35 down MIL STD 1472G for
head rotation
(el-min -0.610865)
(az-max 1.0472)
(az-min -1.0472)
)
(in-range
(range $max-range)
)
)
)
(sensor-domain "visual")
(sensor-offset $sensor-position)
(sensor-positional-error 0.000000)
(detection-level-determinator
(determinator-type "signature-detection-level-determinator")
(detection-level-to-set-hostility 3)
(combat-identification-level-table-file
(filename "$(detection-dir)\std-visual-detection-table.csv")
)
)
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)
)
(controllers )
(actuators )
(connections
(connect system:object-types-to-detect visual-sensor:object-types-to-detect)
(connect visual-sensor:detected-objects system:detected-objects)
(connect system:sensor-offset visual-sensor:sensor-offset)
)
(resources )
(meta-data
(system-name "Human Sensor")
(system-description "Allows an entity to detect other objects through visible light.")
(allowed-state-repository-types "all")
(system-categories "sensor")
(parameter-data-list
(vector-parameter-data
(parameter-name "sensor-position")
(variable-type "DtRwOffsetVector")
(display-label "Sensor Location")
(display-units "meters")
(source-units "meters")
(default-value 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000)
(relative-to "")
)
(real-parameter-data
(parameter-name "max-range")
(variable-type "DtRwReal")
(display-label "Maximum Range")
(display-units "meters")
(source-units "meters")
(default-value 4000.000000)
)
)
(meta-data-entry-list
(detect-object-types-input
(detect-object-types-input-port-name "object-types-to-detect")
)
(detected-objects-output
(detected-objects-output-port-name "detected-objects")
)
)
)
)
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APPENDIX C: MODEL PLANS
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Drive Through Procedure
Plan for SmWhel
SmWhel 1
If (Detect Entity "IED-Artill1" with identification of at least "Detected ,,") then
When (NOT(Detect Entity "IED-Artill1" with identification of at least "Detected ,,"))do
Restart Plan: Name: SmWhel 1
endwhen
else
When (Detect Entity "IED-Artill1" with identification of at least "Detected ,,") do
Wait
endwhen
Move-Along Route: "Route 3"
endif
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Stop and Search Model
Plan for SmWhel
SmWhel 1
If (Detect Entity "Box 3" with identification of at least "Identified ,,") then
When (NOT(Detect Entity "Box 3" with identification of at least "Identified ,,")) do
Restart Plan: Name: SmWhel 1
endwhen
If (Entity-Embarked ,ANY, Entity:"DI 1") then
Send Text Message to: DI 1, "Disembark"
endif
else
When (Detect Entity "Box 3" with identification of at least "Identified ,,") do Restart Plan:
Name: SmWhel 1
endwhen
Move-Along Route: "Route 3"
Endif

Plan for DI
DI 1
When (Receive text message matching "Disembark") do
Task Object R 2 Task: Disembark-Entity
Task Object R 1 Task: Disembark-Entity
Task Object R 3 Task: Disembark-Entity
Task Object R 4 Task: Disembark-Entity
When (AND(AND(AND(NOT(Entity-Embarked ,, Entity:"R 1"), NOT(Entity-Embarked ,,
Entity:"R 2")), NOT(Entity-Embarked ,, Entity:"R 3")),
Move into formation: formation: Vee loc: {-0.003511, -0.000550, 2}heading: 0.0 (Deg)
When (Receive text message matching "IED Detected") do
Wait
endwhen
Patrol-Along Route: "Route 3" endwhen
endwhen
Plan for R 1 page 1
R1
When (Detect Entity "IED-Artill1" with identification of at least "Detected ,,") do
Wait
endwhen

100

Radio When IED Detected
-- This script template has each of the script entry point functions.
-- They are described in detail in VR-Forces Configuration Guide.
-- Some basic VRF Utilities defined in a common module.
require "vrfutil"
-- Global Variables. Global variables get saved when a scenario gets checkpointed.
-- They get re-initialized when a checkpointed scenario is loaded.
-- Task Parameters Available in Script

-- Called when reactive task is enabled or changes to the enabled state.
function checkInit()
-- Set the tick period for this script while checking.
vrf:setTickPeriod(0.5) end
-- Called each tick period for this script while enabled but not in the active state.
function check()
-- Returning true will cause the reactive task to become active and will call init()
-- and tick() until the task completes.
local contacts = this:getAllContacts()
for idx,contact in pairs(contacts) do
if vrf:entityTypeMatches(contact:getEntityType(), EntityType.Munition()) then return true
end end
return false end
-- Called when the task first starts. Never called again.
function init()
-- Set the tick period for this script.
vrf:setTickPeriod(0.5) end
-- Called each tick while this task is active.
function tick()
local agg = vrf:getSimObjectByName("DI 1") vrf:sendMessage(agg, "IED Detected")
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-- endTask() causes the current task to end once the current tick is complete. tick() will not be
called again.
-- Wrap it in an appropriate test for completion of the task.
vrf:endTask(true) end
-- Called when this task is being suspended, likely by a reaction activating.
function suspend()
-- By default, halt all subtasks and other entity tasks started by this task when suspending.
vrf:stopAllSubtasks() vrf:stopAllTasks()
end
-- Called when this task is being resumed after being suspended.
function resume()
-- By default, simply call init() to start the task over.
init() end
-- Called immediately before a scenario checkpoint is saved when
-- this task is active.
-- It is typically not necessary to add code to this function.
function saveState() end
-- Called immediately after a scenario checkpoint is loaded in which
-- this task is active.
-- It is typically not necessary to add code to this function.
function loadState() end
-- Called when this task is ending, for any reason.
-- It is typically not necessary to add code to this function.
function shutdown() end
-- Called whenever the entity receives a text report message while
-- this task is active.
-- message is the message text string.
-- sender is the SimObject which sent the message. function receiveTextMessage(message,
sender) end
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APPENDIX D: LOGGER OUTPUT SAMPLE
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Entity State PDU
********************************************************************************
**** Packet #5
Size=208 time=0:00:00.1696, 18:54:24.9986 Fri Oct 23, 2015
******** Type=PDU #3
***************************************************
PduKind:
EntityStatePduKind (1)
Version:
5
Exercise:
1
ProtocolFamily:
FamilyEntityInteraction (1)
TimeStamp:
3264.98
TimeStampType:
Relative
Size:
208
----------------------------------------EntityId:
1:3001:2
EntityType:
1:1:225:6:1:18:0
ForceID:
ForceFriendly (1)
Location:
{6378138.787991, -59.869135, -396.560779}
Velocity:
{0.000000, 0.000000, 0.000000}
Acceleration:
{0.000000, 0.000000, 0.000000}
Orientation:
{3.141583, -1.541213, 3.138483}
AngularVel:
{0.000000, 0.000000, 0.000000}
DrAlgorithm:
DrDrmRvw (4)
NumArtParams:
4
NumAttachedParts: 0
Guise:
1:1:225:6:1:18:0
Appearance:
6291456
PaintScheme:
0
Immobilized:
FALSE
FirePowerKill:
FALSE
DamageState:
DamageNone (0)
EngineSmoke:
FALSE
SmokePlume:
FALSE
TrailState:
TrailingEffectsNone (0)
HatchState:
HatchNA (0)
LightState:
LightsNone (0)
Flames:
FALSE
Frozen:
TRUE
PowerPlant:
TRUE
FinalPdu:
FALSE
LauncherRaised:
FALSE
CamouflageType:
DesertCamouflage (0)
Concealed:
FALSE
Tent:
FALSE
Ramp:
FALSE
Marking:
SmWhel 1

CharSet:
1
Capabilities:
0
[Change=0, AttachedTo=0, Type=4107, Value = 0, 0]
[Change=0, AttachedTo=0, Type=4108, Value = 0, 0]
[Change=0, AttachedTo=1, Type=4429, Value = 0, 0]
[Change=0, AttachedTo=1, Type=4430, Value = 0, 0]
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Detonation State PDU
********************************************************************************
**** Packet #9864 Size=104 time=0:01:16.7002, 18:55:41.5292 Fri Oct 23, 2015
******** Type=PDU #9860
***************************************************
PduKind:
DetonationPduKind (3)
Version:
5
Exercise:
1
ProtocolFamily:
FamilyWarfare (2)
TimeStamp:
3341.51
TimeStampType:
Relative
Size:
104
----------------------------------------From::
1:3001:97
Target::
0:0:0
Munition::
1:3001:97
Event::
1:3001:4
WorldLocation::
{6378138.144046, -40.628671, -306.916550}
Velocity::
{0.000000, 0.000000, 0.000000}
Result::
DetResDetonation (5)
FuseType::
FuzeProximity (3000)
MunitionType::
2:9:225:2:14:2:1
Quantity::
1
Rate::
0
WarheadType::
WarheadOther (0)
EntityLocation::
{0.000000, 0.000000, 0.000000}
Art Parts:
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APPENDIX E: MANN WHITNEY U-TEST RESULTS STOP AND SEARCH
VS GIVEN SPEED
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Casualties

Model
Stop and
Search
10 KPH

N

Total

3200

1600
1600

Stop and
Search
10 KPH
Total

1600
1600

Mean
Rank
1564.50

Sum of Ranks
2503200.00

1636.50

2618400.00

1590.05

2544080.00

1610.95

2577520.00

3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U

Strike
Casualties
1222400.000 1263280.000

Wilcoxon W

2503200.000 2544080.000

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)

-5.282

-1.776

.000

.076

a. Grouping Variable: Model
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
11KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
1489.50

Sum of
Ranks
2383200.00

1711.50

2738400.00

1558.85

2494160.00

1642.15

2627440.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
11KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U

Strike
Casualties
1102400.000 1213360.000

Wilcoxon W

2383200.000 2494160.000

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)

-12.604

-5.957

.000

.000

a. Grouping Variable: Model

108

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
12KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
1447.00

Sum of
Ranks
2315200.00

1754.00

2806400.00

1530.58

2448920.00

1670.43

2672680.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
12KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U

Strike
Casualties
1034400.000 1168120.000

Wilcoxon W

2315200.000 2448920.000

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)

-15.863

-8.934

.000

.000

a. Grouping Variable: Model
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
13KPH

N

Total

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
13KPH
Total

1600
1600

1600
1600

Mean
Rank
1389.50

Sum of
Ranks
2223200.00

1811.50

2898400.00

1505.23

2408360.00

1695.78

2713240.00

3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
942400.000 1127560.000
2223200.000 2408360.000

Z
-19.799
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-11.235
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
14KPH

N

Total

3200

1600
1600

Casualties Stop and
Search
14KPH
Total

1600
1600

Mean
Rank
1347.00

Sum of
Ranks
2155200.00

1854.00

2966400.00

1475.98

2361560.00

1725.03

2760040.00

3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
874400.000 1080760.000
2155200.000 2361560.000

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)

-22.496

-13.613

.000

.000

a. Grouping Variable: Model
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
15KPH

N

Total

3200

1600
1600

Casualties Stop and
Search
15KPH
Total

1600
1600

Mean
Rank
1221.00

Sum of
Ranks
1953600.00

1980.00

3168000.00

1417.48

2267960.00

1783.53

2853640.00

3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
672800.000

Casualties
987160.000

1953600.000

2267960.000

-29.992

-17.815

.000

.000

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
16KPH

N

Total

3200

1600
1600

Casualties Stop and
Search
16KPH
Total

1600
1600

Mean
Rank
1185.00

Sum of
Ranks
1896000.00

2016.00

3225600.00

1387.74

2220380.00

1813.26

2901220.00

3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
615200.000

Casualties
939580.000

1896000.000

2220380.000

-32.080

-19.770

.000

.000

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

113

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
17KPH

N

Total

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
17KPH
Total

1600
1600

1600
1600

Mean
Rank
1082.50

Sum of
Ranks
1732000.00

2118.50

3389600.00

1339.96

2143940.00

1861.04

2977660.00

3200

Test Statisticsa
Strike
451200.000

Casualties
863140.000

1732000.000

2143940.000

Z
-38.077
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-22.753

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

.000

114

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
18KPH

N

Total

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
18KPH
Total

1600
1600

1600
1600

Mean
Rank
1058.00

Sum of
Ranks
1692800.00

2143.00

3428800.00

1314.61

2103380.00

1886.39

3018220.00

3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
412000.000 822580.000
1692800.000 2103380.000

Z
-39.541
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-24.281
.000

115

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
19KPH

N

Total

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
19KPH
Total

Mean
Rank

1600

964.50

1543200.00

1600

2236.50

3578400.00

1275.13

2040200.00

1925.88

3081400.00

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Sum of
Ranks

Strike
Casualties
262400.000 759400.000
1543200.000 2040200.000

Z
-45.328
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-26.612
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
20KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
20KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
934.00

Sum of
Ranks
1494400.00

2267.00

3627200.00

1258.06

2012900.00

1942.94

3108700.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
213600.000 732100.000
1494400.000 2012900.000

Z
-47.305
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-27.605
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
21KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
21KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
896.50

Sum of
Ranks
1434400.00

2304.50

3687200.00

1229.30

1966880.00

1971.70

3154720.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
153600.000 686080.000
1434400.000 1966880.000

Z
-49.815
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-29.269
.000

118

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
22KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
22KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
862.50

Sum of
Ranks
1380000.00

2338.50

3741600.00

1229.79

1967660.00

1971.21

3153940.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
99200.000 686860.000
1380000.000 1967660.000

Z
-52.176
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-29.241
.000

119

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
23KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
23KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
854.00

Sum of
Ranks
1366400.00

2347.00

3755200.00

1237.10

1979360.00

1963.90

3142240.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
85600.000 698560.000
1366400.000 1979360.000

Z
-52.781
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-28.819
.000

120

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
24KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
24KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
845.50

Sum of
Ranks
1352800.00

2355.50

3768800.00

1203.95

1926320.00

1997.05

3195280.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
72000.000 645520.000
1352800.000 1926320.000

Z
-53.392
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-30.729
.000

121

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
25KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
25KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
853.00

Sum of
Ranks
1364800.00

2348.00

3756800.00

1216.14

1945820.00

1984.86

3175780.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
84000.000 665020.000
1364800.000 1945820.000

Z
-52.853
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-30.028
.000

122

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
26KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
26KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
861.50

Sum of
Ranks
1378400.00

2339.50

3743200.00

1221.99

1955180.00

1979.01

3166420.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
97600.000 674380.000
1378400.000 1955180.000

Z
-52.247
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-29.691
.000

123

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Casualties

Model
Stop and
Search
27KPH
Total

N

Stop and
Search
27KPH
Total

1600
1600

Mean
Rank
872.00

Sum of
Ranks
1395200.00

2329.00

3726400.00

1239.54

1983260.00

1961.46

3138340.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
114400.000 702460.000
1395200.000 1983260.000

Z
-51.508
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-28.678
.000

124

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
28KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
867.50

Sum of
Ranks
1388000.00

2333.50

3733600.00

1203.95

1926320.00

1997.05

3195280.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
28KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
107200.000
1388000.00
0
-51.823

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
645520.000
1926320.00
0
-30.729
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
29KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
865.00

Sum of
Ranks
1384000.00

2336.00

3737600.00

1209.31

1934900.00

1991.69

3186700.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
29KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
103200.000
1384000.00
0
-52.000

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
654100.000
1934900.00
0
-30.420
.000

126

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
30KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
869.00

Sum of
Ranks
1390400.00

2332.00

3731200.00

1231.25

1970000.00

1969.75

3151600.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
30KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
109600.000
1390400.00
0
-51.718

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
689200.000
1970000.00
0
-29.157
.000

127

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
31KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
874.50

Sum of
Ranks
1399200.00

2326.50

3722400.00

1241.98

1987160.00

1959.03

3134440.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
31KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
118400.000
1399200.00
0
-51.333

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
706360.000
1987160.00
0
-28.537
.000

128

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
32KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
891.50

Sum of
Ranks
1426400.00

2309.50

3695200.00

1263.43

2021480.00

1937.58

3100120.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
32KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
145600.000
1426400.00
0
-50.157

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
740680.000
2021480.00
0
-27.294
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
33KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
879.50

Sum of
Ranks
1407200.00

2321.50

3714400.00

1255.14

2008220.00

1945.86

3113380.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
33KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
126400.000 727420.000
1407200.000 2008220.000

Z
-50.985
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-27.775
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
34KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
34KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
881.00

Sum of
Ranks
1409600.00

2320.00

3712000.00

1253.68

2005880.00

1947.33

3115720.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
128800.000 725080.000
1409600.000 2005880.000

Z
-50.881
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-27.860
.000

131

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
35KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
886.50

Sum of
Ranks
1418400.00

2314.50

3703200.00

1261.48

2018360.00

1939.53

3103240.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
35KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
137600.000
1418400.00
0
-50.500

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
737560.000
2018360.00
0
-27.407
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
36KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
36KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
881.50

Sum of
Ranks
1410400.00

2319.50

3711200.00

1265.38

2024600.00

1935.63

3097000.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
129600.000 743800.000
1410400.000 2024600.000

Z
-50.846
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-27.180
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
37KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
858.00

Sum of
Ranks
1372800.00

2343.00

3748800.00

1249.78

1999640.00

1951.23

3121960.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
37KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
92000.000
1372800.00
0
-52.496

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
718840.000
1999640.00
0
-28.086
.000

134

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
38KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
38KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
869.50

Sum of
Ranks
1391200.00

2331.50

3730400.00

1272.20

2035520.00

1928.80

3086080.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
110400.000 754720.000
1391200.000 2035520.000

Z
-51.683
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-26.782
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
39KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
877.00

Sum of
Ranks
1403200.00

2324.00

3718400.00

1250.26

2000420.00

1950.74

3121180.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
39KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
122400.000
1403200.00
0
-51.158

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
719620.000
2000420.00
0
-28.058
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
40KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
875.50

Sum of
Ranks
1400800.00

2325.50

3720800.00

1240.51

1984820.00

1960.49

3136780.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
40KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
120000.000
1400800.00
0
-51.263

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
704020.000
1984820.00
0
-28.622
.000

137

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
41KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
880.50

Sum of
Ranks
1408800.00

2320.50

3712800.00

1262.45

2019920.00

1938.55

3101680.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
41KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
128000.000
1408800.00
0
-50.915

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
739120.000
2019920.00
0
-27.350
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
42KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
882.50

Sum of
Ranks
1412000.00

2318.50

3709600.00

1259.04

2014460.00

1941.96

3107140.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
42KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
131200.000
1412000.00
0
-50.777

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
733660.000
2014460.00
0
-27.549
.000

139

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
43KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
884.00

Sum of
Ranks
1414400.00

2317.00

3707200.00

1263.91

2022260.00

1937.09

3099340.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
43KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
133600.000
1414400.00
0
-50.673

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
741460.000
2022260.00
0
-27.265
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
44KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
44KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
880.50

Sum of
Ranks
1408800.00

2320.50

3712800.00

1261.96

2019140.00

1939.04

3102460.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
128000.000 738340.000
1408800.000 2019140.000

Z
-50.915
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-27.379
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
45KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
45KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
879.00

Sum of
Ranks
1406400.00

2322.00

3715200.00

1259.53

2015240.00

1941.48

3106360.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
125600.000 734440.000
1406400.000 2015240.000

Z
-51.019
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-27.520
.000

142

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
46KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
46KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
886.50

Sum of
Ranks
1418400.00

2314.50

3703200.00

1279.03

2046440.00

1921.98

3075160.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
137600.000 765640.000
1418400.000 2046440.000

Z
-50.500
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-26.383
.000

143

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
47KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
886.00

Sum of
Ranks
1417600.00

2315.00

3704000.00

1244.90

1991840.00

1956.10

3129760.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
47KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
136800.000
1417600.00
0
-50.535

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
711040.000
1991840.00
0
-28.368
.000

144

Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search

N
1600

48KPH

Total
Casualties Stop and
Search
48KPH
Total

1600

Mean
Rank
892.00

Sum of
Ranks
1427200.00

2309.00

3694400.00

1279.03

2046440.00

1921.98

3075160.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
146400.000 765640.000
1427200.000 2046440.000

Z
-50.123
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-26.383
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
49KPH
Total

Casualties Stop and
Search
49KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
884.50

Sum of
Ranks
1415200.00

2316.50

3706400.00

1281.95

2051120.00

1919.05

3070480.00

3200
1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
Casualties
134400.000 770320.000
1415200.000 2051120.000

Z
-50.638
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

-26.212
.000
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Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks

Strike

Model
Stop and
Search
50KPH
Total

N
1600
1600

Mean
Rank
884.50

Sum of
Ranks
1415200.00

2316.50

3706400.00

1279.51

2047220.00

1921.49

3074380.00

3200

Casualties Stop and
Search
50KPH
Total

1600
1600
3200

Test Statisticsa

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W

Strike
134400.000
1415200.00
0
-50.638

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2.000
tailed)
a. Grouping Variable: Model

Casualties
766420.000
2047220.00
0
-26.355
.000
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